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Science and Technology Policy 
in Developed and Developing Countries 
May I say what a pleasure it is to be back in Toronto after 
first arriving here 28 years ago to start work as a graduate 
student with Tuzo Wilson. The dominant theme that 
seems to be emerging from the hundreds of thousands of 
words of both talk and writing in preparation for the 
Vienna conference — a theme that was touched upon by 
both Guy Gresford and Jorge Sabato last night, a theme 
that seems to dominate the thinking of the developing 
countries' contributions to this preparation — is this tre- 
cHGOldh mendous determination and concern 
that the developing 
Universit 7' countries of the world achieve what they are calling 
Sussex science and technology self-reliance. I think it is import- 
ant to understand that this phrase, science and 
technology self-reliance, is far more than rhetoric. It has 
an importance as rhetoric, but when one pierces that surface, one finds that 
there are specific guidelines for policymakers in the developing world. 
The most important of these guidelines is that the first component of 
self-reliance is the determination to achieve the ability to make one's own 
decisions about all aspects of how science and technology are going to 
contribute to development. That, I think, is the foremost requirement of the 
Third World nations going to the Vienna conference. 
The second component of self-reliance is a determination to have an ability 
to contribute some of the elements of technical knowledge that are going to be 
required in a nation to achieve this link between science and technology and 
development. 
But it is the first aspect, this ability to make one's own decisions about all 
matters of science and technology, that I propose to address now. If there is a de- 
termination to have this ability, it means having the ability to make one's own 
science and technology policies and to implement them. Although I have been 
asked to address the topic of science policy, I am going to include technology 
policy because, after all, what has come to dominate the discussions about the 
United Nations conference and most discussions about science and technology 
in the Third World is: What can technology do for development? 
To understand the current views of the Third World about science and 
technology policies, it is necessary to have a brief historical introduction to the 
topic. Science policy is really a product of the concerns of nations in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) after 
World War II. There was the concern about how to use scientific research for 
economic growth, which led to the idea that nations need to have their own 
science policy to help them achieve their economic growth objectives. It was 
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Alexander King, in his role as Scientific Director of OECD, who played a major 
role in determining what scientific research might do to help economic growth. 
Much of the thinking at that time, in the 1950s, led to the idea that a science 
council should be established in most countries to design policies for scientific 
research relating to economic development. The science councils generally had 
eminent scientists as their members, with an occasional politician and 
sometimes somebody from the industrial community. 
This is what seemed to be happening in the developed world toward the end 
of the 1950s and in the early 1960s when there emerged a concern in the Third 
World, articulated to quite an extent at the United Nations conference in 1963 in 
Geneva, as to what science and technology can do for us, how it can help us in 
our development. And it appeared that the developed world had provided an 
answer: they had established their science councils to design science policy. 
Perhaps the same thing should be done in the Third World. 
The institution of similar science councils in the Third World was aided by 
such international organizations as UNESCO, OECD, and, to some extent, the 
Organization of American States. Later, in the 1960s, we saw a proliferation of 
science councils throughout the developing world. They were charged explicitly 
with establishing science policy as a link between science, technology, and 
development. But it didn't work. 
I remember very clearly being at a meeting of the directors and secretaries 
general of the science councils of Latin America in Lima in 1971. They were 
meeting to discuss their experiences in designing science policy and 
contributing to development. The Secretary General of the Venezuelan science 
council at one of the informal sessions said: 
Look, I think we're in real difficulty. We have had a science council now 
in Venezuela for 5 years. We have a lot more money for science. There are 
more scientists; there are more scientific institutions. But I cannot honestly 
point to a single example where all of this additional investment in science 
has contributed one iota to what I would consider development. We 
formulate science policies, but nobody seems to take any notice of them; 
nobody implements them. Why? 
The whole pattern of the meeting changed. Once the Venezuelan had 
broken the ice, all the others came forward and said that it was the same in their 
countries. When this was realized, the reasons were sought. Perhaps the 
difficulty was that they didn't know what policy instruments should be used to 
put into effect the policies they had been designing. Maybe the developed 
countries had a list of policy instruments that were useful to them. Maybe they 
should try to find out whether a study had been done that would tell them how to 
link policy with implementation. This gave rise to a study, of which Francisco 
Sagasti was the international coordinator: 10 countries, over a 2- or 3-year 
period, looked intensively in their own countries at the means that had been 
used or might be used to implement their science and technology policies to 
make them more relevant to the industrial needs of their societies. 
It was this mood of frustration and disappointment about the contributions 
of science to development that led to the Science and Technology Policy Instru- 
ments (STPI) project and to awaveof otherstudiesthroughouttheThird World — not just in Latin America but also in India and in many countries in Southeast 
Asia. As Jorge Sabato said yesterday, it was the knowledge resulting from this 
decade or more of studies carried out in Third World countries by Third World 
researchers that created the understanding that exists in these countries about 
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their science policy issues and that is being fed into the preparatory discussions 
for the Vienna conference. 
In the short time I have, I would like to highlight what seems to me to be 
some of the more important conclusions that have arisen from this recent surge 
of studies related to science and technology policy. Some of the conclusions 
may seem pretty obvious to you now, but I can assure you that when they first 
surfaced they were far from obvious. They have come to influence decisions 
considerably, not only nationally but also internationally. 
From the group of studies carried out in the Andean Pact countries, there 
emerged several things. Most important was the recognition that science and 
technology policies need to cover the full range of scientific and technical 
activities; the earlier emphasis on policies only for scientific research was mis- 
placed because it left out the whole spectrum of other scientific and technical 
activities that are required for production. Also recognized was that investment 
in building up engineering design organizations or policies to help promote 
technical information services may be far more important in the early stages of 
industrialization than policies of research. 
The second thing to come out of the Andean Pact studies was the 
recognition that the foreign investment in their countries was a combination of 
capital and technology, and that it was not sufficient to have policies to monitor 
and control the flow of capital alone. You have to have technology policies that 
cope with the investment of technology as well as the investment of capital. And 
the Andean Pact enunciated policies for exactly these purposes. 
The STPI project showed strikingly in almost all the 10 countries in which 
the studies were carried out just how ineffective were the existing institutions for 
science and technology policy. They might have produced excellent science and 
technology plans, but the effectiveness of explicit policies for science and 
technology in affecting the decisions made by industrialists and entrepreneurs 
was limited. Far more effective in determining the technological decisions that 
were going to be made in enterprises were the policies enunciated in economic 
councils or by treasuries — fiscal policies, tax policies, and so on. This situation 
generated its own jargon in the terms "implicit" and "explicit" science and tech- 
nology policies, ajargon that is now creeping into the preparations for the United 
Nations conference. To put it in a nutshell: technology policy is far more closely 
linked with economic policy than with science policy. There should be a shift in 
the whole policymaking structure within the Third World countries toward 
linking technology with economics far more closely than in the past and perhaps 
moving farther away from the link with science as established by the science 
councils. 
A third general result of these studies — and from many others in the Third 
World — is the recognition that in acquiring foreign technology you just regard 
technology as a commodity. It is something that is bought and sold and 
negotiated for. You have to understand the rules of the game in this negotiation. 
They need to be made explicit not only for national policies but also for 
international policy. And the understanding gained by the Third World of the 
rules of the game in the past has been essential to them in their negotiations on 
the new code of conduct in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel. 
opment (UNCTAD). 
The fourth main result of these studies is the recognition of the importance 
of the earlier emphasis on science and technology policies to stimulate the 
supply of knowledge. These policies needed to be complemented by policies 
that would affect the demand for knowledge, in particular the demand in local 
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enterprises for local technology so that the technology that was developed 
would be more appropriate than what could be imported. This need for explicit 
policies to affect demand is very important. 
A fifth result, one really developed in the last couple of years by Máximo 
Halty-Carrere, who died about 3 months ago, at the culmination of the first 
phase of his project, was the recognition that there was a bridge between policy 
and implementation, a technology strategy. l-Ialty-Carrere's studies of 
technology strategies had shown, surprisingly, that many of the components of a 
strategy of technology and industrialization are common to all countries, 
regardless of their political ideology, and depend almost entirely on a country's 
level of development and industrialization. Out of this he was developing some 
guidelines for strategies. 
And, finally, point six: It has been disappointing to discover just how little 
knowledge has been generated on how to relate scientific investment and 
science and technology investment to problems of rural development. Almost all 
the studies have had to do with how to improve the modern sector. Very few 
useful guidelines have been produced on the link between science and the 
poverty of 80% of the population. 
While all this work has been going on in developing countries, groups in the 
North have been looking at their own problems of science policy. And I think 
they have been coming to similar conclusions. First of all, they have come to 
recognize the diversity of goals for which science and technology must be used: 
initially the economy was the prime target, but now there is as much or more 
emphasis on health care, the environment, energy, resources, and employment. 
As in developing countries, analysts have concluded that technological 
policymaking needs to be located in the centres where decisions about all other 
activities are made. 
And here we come more or less full circle to where we were in the 1950s, 
with the need to have a science policy because there is a danger of being left out 
with all the emphasis on technology. 
In conclusion, I should like to underline what Jorge Sabato said yesterday 
about recognizing that we are just scratching the surface of our understanding of 
how science and technology can be used to help solve the problems of both the 
developed and the developing countries, the global problems, the international 
problems, the national problems. The need for further analysis and study so as 
to elucidate these issues is paramount. 
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